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Abstract 
 
Financial integration is less pronounced in East Asia than among states in Europe and North 
America, or compared to economic integration within the region. Cross-border trade flows, 
direct investment and investment in capital goods have long been greater and faster growing than 
other investment flows, while regional institutional and legal structures are scarce and frequently 
insubstantive. This dichotomy persists despite suggestions since the early 1990s that Asian 
financial integration would accelerate, most especially following the East Asian financial crisis 
of 1997-98, including the growth of regional representative organizations and in national 
enthusiasm for the World Trade Organization. In particular, it defies post-crisis expectations that 
greater financial integration might prevent or lessen the impact of future financial shocks. This 
article suggests explanations in legal, governance and institutional frameworks for the paradox 
of modest financial integration accompanying robust economic growth and trade integration. 
First, cultural norms militate against regional innovation in financial markets and systems. 
Second, other economic institutions have tended to resist market-orientated regional reform. 
Above all, states failed to collaborate effectively in solutions to regional contagion during and 
following the 1997-98 financial crisis. Without improving financial integration, Asia will 
maintain a reliance on risk averse portfolio selection and excessive international reserve 
accumulation, all to the detriment of its financial markets. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
The extent of financial integration among East Asia’s emerging and developing economies1 and 
Japan matches neither the rhetoric expended in its support after the region’s 1997-98 financial 
crisis nor the degree of regional economic integration. By some measures, it is exceeded by 
financial integration with Australia, New Zealand and most developed western economies. 
Cross-border trade flows, direct investment and cross-border investment in capital goods have 
long been greater and faster growing than other regional capital flows. Regional institutional 
structures and organizations concerned with finance are scarce and generally insubstantive. The 
interplay between national and international finance is limited, even among nations with 
relatively sophisticated financial systems such as South Korea or Singapore. No existing market 
can be considered regional: Asian intermediaries freely enter global capital market transactions 
denominated in non-regional currencies but regional markets are underdeveloped and price 
opaque. This dichotomy persists despite certain developments since the early 1990s that might 
have encouraged financial integration, and notwithstanding the development of organizations 
such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which might be expected to favor 
financial liberalization. It contrasts with financial integration in the European Union (EU), with 
Asian national enthusiasm for participation in the World Trade Organization (WTO), and with 
the sophistication of financial intermediation in several Asian centres. Above all, it differs from 
post-crisis consensus expectations that greater financial integration would help guard against any 
further shocks or ameliorate their effects. 
 
This article will show how economic, commercial and financial aspects of regional governance 
in Asia have become manifest in loose transnational organizations and institutions and through 
“functional cooperation” in national state policy,2 especially in regional trade policy, dispute 
resolution, and monetary cooperation. It will suggest that issues of governance help explain why 
modest financial integration accompanies generally successful economic growth and economic 
integration. First, long-standing cultural norms and legal systems militate against innovation in 
                                                        
1 Emerging economies are taken as undergoing integration into the global financial system; developing economies 
are those developing domestic financial systems sufficient to permit participation in the global financial system. See 
DOUGLAS ARNER, FINANCIAL STABILITY, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE ROLE OF LAW, Ch. 1 (Cambridge University 
Press, 2007). 
2 See infra note 26. 
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financial markets and systems, insofar as reforms in transnational institutions or organizations 
would require sacrifices in state autonomy. This has been expressed consistently within regional 
groups and characterized as the quiescent “ASEAN Way.” 3  This strict preference for 
consensuality encourages only incremental or pedestrian regional reform. Second, other 
socio-economic institutions tend to resist the adoption of market-orientated regional solutions, 
even when they might arise through inter-state cooperation. In particular, national banking 
systems that dominate saving and credit creation and strong symbiotic relationships between 
state and banking sector actors tend to slow financial integration, with entrenched interest groups 
unwilling to compromise their positions in financial governance to countervailing regional 
institutions or organizations. 
 
The article is directly concerned only with regional financial integration and makes no attempt to 
address how governance standards affect financial market behavior, for example, by influencing 
general expectations or asset valuations.4 Neither does it consider integration between Asia and 
elsewhere. Unless stated, references in this article to economic or financial integration signify no 
transnational political objectives. Shortly before the 1957 Treaty of Rome created the European 
Economic Community (EEC),5 economic integration was said by an influential libertarian 
scholar to be “the establishment of a condition which makes possible the free and reciprocal flow 
of trade between the various national economies”,6 requiring both free trade in goods and free 
movement of capital funds.7 It is appropriate to assess East Asia’s contemporary integration ten 
years after the East Asian financial crisis with reference to the permissiveness of cross-border 
regional trade and capital flows.8 
 
The following section II reviews the structure of Asian financial integration in relation to issues 
                                                        
3 See infra note 29. 
4 Financial governance in Asia is the concern of state or commercial actors, and influenced only modestly by 
external official sources such as regional transnational organizations. 
5 Among Belgium, France, the former West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, a group that 
remained unchanged until 1973. 
6 WILHELM RÖPKE, Economic Order and International Law, 86 RECUEIL DES COURS II (1954), at 251. 
7 Id. at 252. 
8 Röpke’s description of the European Payments Union (1950-1958) as an arrangement in functional cooperation 
resembles the ASEAN+3 web of central bank payment lines, see infra, sec. IV.B. With the European Coal and Steel 
Community (1952-2002), this was held to be one of “two great international actions [...] to further Europe’s 
economic integration,” Id. at 258. ASEAN+3 is an ad hoc group comprising ASEAN’s members plus China, Japan 
and South Korea. 
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of governance. Section III then identifies factors that help explain the extent of current financial 
integration, and section IV examines attempts to encourage integration in trade in financial 
services, cooperation in monetary policy, and capital market development. Section V discusses 
non-Asian influences, including the WTO’s framework for trade in financial services, and asks 
whether experiences in European financial integration may inform similar developments in Asia 
more than thought feasible by early theorists of regionalism.9 Section VI concludes with policy 
recommendations.  
 
II.  East Asian Financial Cooperation and Governance  
 
Financial integration is associated with capital mobility,10 and is the extent to which an 
economy’s financial system is not shielded or made distinct from other national and international 
capital markets. It is thus the antithesis of the Bretton Woods international financial system that 
prevailed for almost thirty years following World War II.11 Such integration is difficult to 
identify consistently,12 because it can often be quantified only by proxy, and since its use was for 
long conflated with other forms of integration. The concept is now more carefully considered 
than before the 1990s, prior to which views as to what integration might mean were undeveloped 
and reflected a contemporary view that all aspects of finance were subservient to trade or 
                                                        
9 Notably Ernst Haas, see infra note 37 & note 44. 
10 See FRITZ MACHLUP, A HISTORY OF THOUGHT ON ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 71-72 (Macmillan 1977), noting also 
that “integration” was not used in this sense before the mid-1950s. Id. at 13-16. True financial integration in the 
sense taken here was known in earlier times, see Larry Neal, Integration of International Capital Markets: 
Quantitative Evidence from the Eighteenth to Twentieth Centuries, 45 J. ECON. HIST. 2, 219, 221 (1985) (suggesting 
that the established European equity markets were well-integrated in this sense by the mid-18th century, albeit that 
there were at the time no state capital controls). 
11 Bretton Woods required the separation of national markets to support fixed exchange rates, independent national 
monetary policies and general stability, see ARNER, supra note 1, Ch. 3. One paradox of that system is that it 
allowed the creation of the offshore regional Eurobond market in the 1960s. Until the mid-1980s the Eurobond 
market was a permissive institution that relied on the circumvention of national rules. Without a web of national 
obstructions the market would have been both unnecessary and infeasible. No such regional market exists today in 
Asia. Recent EU commentary also suggests an analogy between Bretton Woods and Asia’s partial regulation: 
The experience of the 1930s was interpreted as proof that international capital flows were 
destabilizing domestic economies. Thus, capital flows were the subject of exchange controls and 
regulations during the 1950s and 1960s, keeping cross-border financial transactions to a minimum. 
See THE EU ECONOMY 2003 REVIEW at 320 (European Union, 2003) available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/the_eu_economy_review2003_en.htm 
(accessed Mar. 21, 2007). 
12 APOSTOLOS GKOUTZINIS, How Far is Basel from Geneva? International Regulatory Convergence and the 
Elimination of Barriers to International Financial Integration, SSRN working paper 2006, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=699781 (accessed Mar. 21, 2007). 
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production. Financial integration emphasizes wholesale activity and examines only secondarily 
those aspects of retail financial intermediation involving individuals.13 Thus legal or customary 
borders to the trade in retail financial services prevail even in well-integrated regions such as the 
European Union.14 
 
Financial integration has also been taken to refer to the extent of correlations in price 
performance of two or more markets or systems, for example in equity securities or interest 
rates.15 This is related to the subject of this article only insofar as arbitrage undertaken on the 
strength of such correlations may involve capital movements of the kind obstructed by Asia’s 
lack of integration. It implies “mobility [of capital] and substitutability among comparable 
financial assets in terms of yields, maturities and risk in international financial markets”16 and 
the expectation of a “full speedy adjustment of asset stocks in response to price changes.”17 
Thus true financial integration can be expected to lead to an international convergence of 
financial asset prices, but the analysis in this article is more closely associated with the needs and 
preferences of market users. Financial integration is taken to be distinct from integration in 
commerce, economic policy, monetary policy or political cooperation, however often such 
policies may be inter-related,18 and despite relying upon mechanisms commonly identified as 
                                                        
13 Wholesale financial market activity is taken to be that conducted among professional, state, official or corporate 
counterparties, and is generally subject to lower levels of regulatory scrutiny than retail activities. 
14  An early influential EEC study of the benefits of financial integration is CLAUDE SEGRÉ ET AL, THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF A EUROPEAN CAPITAL MARKET: REPORT OF A GROUP OF EXPERTS APPOINTED BY THE EEC 
COMMISSION (European Economic Community, 1966). Segré lamented the lack of progress in dismantling national 
barriers to financial activity but plays down the political implications of financial integration. See infra sec. V.C. & 
note 153. 
15 See e.g., JING CHI, KE LI & MARTIN YOUNG, Financial Integration in East Asian Equity Markets, 11 PACIFIC 
ECON. REV. 4, 513 (2006); EDUARDO LEVY YEYATI, SERGIO LUIS SCHMUKLER & NEELTJE VAN HOREN, 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INTEGRATION THROUGH THE LAW OF ONE PRICE (World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper No. 3897, 2006). Financial integration is not taken here as that adopted to test asset price or index correlations 
between national or segmented markets, not least because “price co-movements could reflect common factors and/or 
similarities in fundamentals, rather than the degree of integration.” See DAVID COWEN & RANIL SALGADO, 
Globalization of Production and Financial Integration in Asia, in FINANCIAL INTEGRATION IN ASIA: RECENT 
DEVELOPMENTS AND NEXT STEPS (David Cowen, Ranil Salgado, Hemant Shah, Leslie Teo & Alessandro Zanello, 
eds., IMF WORKING PAPER NO. 06/196, 2006).  
16 WILLIAM SHEPHERD, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INTEGRATION: HISTORY, THEORY AND APPLICATIONS IN OECD 
COUNTRIES 77-79 (Aldershot, 1994). But note that “substitutability” today would include synthetic transactions such 
as offshore non-deliverable derivative contracts, the existence of which implies extant capital controls or other 
barriers to financial integration. 
17 Id. at 78. 
18 Integration in commercial or economic policy refers to arrangements for trade and foreign direct investment; 
monetary integration refers to formal currency cooperation; political integration involves deliberate sharing of 
national sovereignty. 
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political.19  
 
The premise of this article is that Asian financial integration is modest, even though cross-border 
acquisitions, joint ventures and other forms of regional cross-border investment are 
well-established and require substantial transfers of funding or capital goods. A recent study 
published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) found that: 
[T]otal financial liabilities in Asia (the combined stock of foreign direct 
investment (FDI), foreign loans, and equity holdings) is typically lower than in 
other regions of the world. Moreover, intraregional financial integration — for 
example, measured directly by cross-border capital flows or indirectly by 
cross-border correlation of consumption growth — has been more limited than 
elsewhere. Consequently, Asian economies appear to have become more 
integrated with countries outside the region than within the region.20 
 
Evidence of a direct relationship between financial integration and economic growth is 
inconclusive.21 This is significant in terms of state norms in Asia, given that capital controls 
                                                        
19 But which may arise from economic factors such as incentives to political action. For a description of four major 
such mechanisms see COLIN BENNETT, What Is Policy Convergence and What Causes It?, 21 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 2, 
215 (1991), identifying policy emulation, harmonization, penetration and the existence of elite policy groups. See 
also infra sec. III.D. 
20 See GRACIELA KAMINSKY & MARCO CIPRIANI, A NEW ERA OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INTEGRATION: 
GLOBAL, MARKET, AND REGIONAL FACTORS (Hong Kong University School of Economics & Finance Workshop 
Discussion Paper No. 534, 2006); Cowen & Salgado, see supra note 15, at 11 (suggesting that:  
the region generates substantial net saving [… ] and countries have been accumulating large stocks 
of foreign reserves. This has resulted in the financial sectors of developed countries in Europe and 
North America serving as financial intermediaries for the Asian economies, with relatively more 
stable outbound official flows and more volatile inbound private flows.) 
If high Asian net national saving was induced partly by the financial crisis, and such saving implies lesser financial 
integration, it is less clear why the accumulation of reserves has continued despite a steady recovery in Asian 
sovereign credit ratings since 2000, but seems to suggest how profound was the crisis. See infra sec. III.B. 
21 See MORITZ SCHULARICK & THOMAS STEGER, DOES FINANCIAL INTEGRATION SPUR ECONOMIC GROWTH? NEW 
EVIDENCE FROM THE FIRST ERA OF FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION (CESIFO Working Paper No. 1691, 2006), available 
at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=884434 (accessed Mar. 21, 2007), suggesting that developmental benefits 
associated with financial integration require prior domestic institutional reform, in particular the maintenance of 
adequate and enforceable property rights. The indeterminate result may signify problems in the empirical 
specification of financial integration, which is most commonly observed in the ratio of capital flows, or holdings of 
foreign assets and liabilities, to national income, or represented by a binary indicator for cross-border capital 
controls. See also PHILIP LANE & GIAN MARIA MILESI-FERRETTI, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INTEGRATION (IMF 
Working Paper No. WP/03/86, 2003) (using an index based on the sum of foreign assets and liabilities to national 
income). This is contextually important in that if modest financial integration is linked to high net national savings, 
then the disutility of reserve accumulation is compounded by developmental effects. See PHILIP LANE & SERGIO 
SCHMUKLER, The International Financial Integration of China and India, INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL 
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were anathema to the IMF from at least the mid-1980s until they became controversial in the 
wake of the 1997-98 financial crisis.22 Since then, capital controls have been more widely 
favored, partly due to their use by states such as China and Malaysia that were relatively lightly 
affected by the crisis.23 
 
Concepts of governance often abstract from thin material. While governance has been taken to 
involve a proactive state “sustaining coordination and coherence among a wide variety of 
actors”24 that might include transnational organizations, it may also represent the “empirical 
manifestations of state adaptation to its external environment” or alternatively “a theoretical 
representation of coordination of social systems”25 by the state and others. Such conceptual 
inclusiveness allows a discussion of whatever governance that is manifested through East Asian 
regional financial integration to include instances where none exists, that is, an absence of 
governance analogous to the view of Asian regionalism as a form of “pre-governance,”26 and the 
roles taken by non-state commercial actors, especially from the financial sector. The most 
appropriate approach for this analysis may be to regard governance as “[t]he processes and 
institutions, both formal and informal, that guide and restrain the collective activities of a 
group.” 27  Weakness in these processes and institutions reflect an absence of regional 
governance.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
INTEGRATION STUDIES DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 174 (2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=925872 (accessed 
Mar. 21, 2007). 
22 During the 1990s the IMF and World Bank advocated and when possible demanded that developing states follow 
free market policies, characterized as the “Washington Consensus”, see JOHN WILLIAMSON, What Washington 
Means by Policy Reform, in JOHN WILLIAMSON (ed.), LATIN AMERICAN ADJUSTMENT: HOW MUCH HAS HAPPENED? 
Ch. 2 (Institute for International Economics, 1990). Williamson later recanted part of the consensus relating to 
financial integration, arguing that “the policies these institutions advocated in the 1990s were inimical to the cause 
of poverty reduction in emerging markets in at least one respect: their advocacy of capital account liberalization.” 
JOHN WILLIAMSON, What Should the World Bank Think about the Washington Consensus?, 15 WORLD BANK RES. 
OBSERVER 2, 257 (2000). 
23 China has maintained extensive capital controls throughout a period of relatively rapid growth in national income 
since the late 1970s. Malaysia’s less comprehensive restrictions on the withdrawal of foreign capital may have 
helped its economy and financial markets suffer less severely in the Asian financial crisis and recover more rapidly 
thereafter. See also infra sec. III.A. 
24 JON PIERRE, Introduction, in DEBATING GOVERNANCE 3 (Jon Pierre, ed., Oxford University Press, 2000). 
25 Id. 
26 ANTHONY PAYNE, Globalization and Regionalist Governance, in DEBATING GOVERNANCE, supra note 24, at 
214-215.  
27 ROBERT KEOHANE & JOSEPH NYE, Governance in a Globalizing World, in GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBALIZING 
WORLD 12 (Joseph Nye & John Donahue, eds., Brookings Institution, 2000). 
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That Asia’s financial integration lags its considerable economic integration may appear 
inconsistent with the sophistication of certain of its domestic financial systems. The explanation 
may result from the influence of cultural norms operating at state and sub-state level that, as 
sections III and IV will show, govern behavior within Asia’s regional institutions and 
organizations. This influence is manifest in an elective aspect of state governance, that is, the 
primacy of certain national economic policies with which regional financial integration is 
commonly deemed inconsistent. Such norms are comprehensively represented by the “ASEAN 
Way,” stemming from ASEAN’s founding declaration and succeeding first treaty, 28  and 
involving consensual decision-making and commitments to mutual non-interference by member 
states. It was characterized during the 1997-98 financial crisis by Singapore’s foreign minister as 
stressing “informality, organizational minimalism, inclusiveness, intensive consultations leading 
to consensus, and peaceful resolution, of disputes.”29 
 
The nature of financial governance in Asia as revealed in the behavior of its regional 
organizations and institutions is thus the result of weak regional norms competing with 
paramount national policy. Today’s limited financial integration may be regarded as having been 
achieved in spite of such norms.30  
 
Founded in 1967, ASEAN has become the most conspicuous organization associated with Asian 
regionalism. This reflects both a growing disutility of APEC (the Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Forum),31 and ASEAN’s embracing China, Japan and South Korea, the dominant 
economies of Northeast Asia, through the ASEAN+3 mechanism. Throughout this article, 
ASEAN and ASEAN+3 are referred to as organizations or as the products of institutional 
arrangements since their existence is real when measured by actions or norms. It is less clear in 
                                                        
28 See respectively The ASEAN Declaration, 1967, available at http://www.aseansec.org/1212.htm (accessed Mar. 
21, 2007), & Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, 1976, available at 
http://www.aseansec.org/1217.htm (accessed Mar. 21, 2007). 
29 Shanmugam Jayakumar, “Stick to Basics” (speech to ASEAN ministerial meeting, Jul. 24, 1998), available at 
http://www.aseansec.org/3924.htm (accessed Mar. 21, 2007). See also AMITAV ACHARYA, The Evolution of ASEAN 
Norms and the Emergence of the ASEAN Way at 47-70 in AMITAV ACHARYA, CONSTRUCTING A SECURITY 
COMMUNITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: ASEAN AND THE PROBLEM OF REGIONAL ORDER (Routledge, 2001).  
30 Most of the regional groupings formed up to 2005 in Asia are listed in ADVANCING EAST ASIAN REGIONALISM 
247-254 (Melissa Curley & Nicholas Thomas, eds., Routledge, 2007). 
31 See notably JOHN RAVENHILL, APEC AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF PACIFIC RIM REGIONALISM (Cambridge 
University Press, 2001). 
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law that either body represents at a non-trivial level more than an association of states without 
legal personality.32 For example, when ASEAN chooses to make substantive agreements with 
third parties, for example in relation to trade with a non-ASEAN state such as China, then each 
state (ASEAN and non-ASEAN) would enter a separate treaty. ASEAN is more an expression of 
aims than a substantive, constitutionally formed body. This “soft” personality intentionally 
constrains its capacity in regional governance.  
 
ASEAN was for long unconcerned with the financial sector but began discussing regional 
financial matters in the mid-1990s.33 This was influenced by the 1997-98 financial crisis, a 
consensual wish to see the region distinguished from elsewhere, and a surge in the growth of 
trade with China and cross-border direct investment to China from ASEAN members. In 1995, 
ASEAN’s heads of governments declared that it:  
shall move towards greater economic integration by building on existing 
economic cooperation activities, initiating new areas of cooperation, and 
promoting closer cooperation in international fora.34  
 
ASEAN’s first venture in financial cooperation was a cooperative framework among national 
bodies for banking, capital markets, customs, insurance, taxation, and related human resources, 
ironically made immediately prior to the financial crisis in early 1997. 35  This protocol 
encourages members to discuss macroeconomic and regulatory policies, improve policy and 
regulatory transparency, and promote links between the public and private sectors. The 
agreement was made subject to ASEAN’s consensual approach with the proviso that two or more 
members might engage in the implementation of programs and projects at their chosen pace 
                                                        
32 A proposal for ASEAN to assume a legal personality was to have been discussed at a postponed 2006 heads of 
state summit in January 2007, upon the recommendation of an ASEAN “Eminent Persons” study convened as part 
of a 2005 initiative named Vision 2020 to revise ASEAN’s charter. It is thought that ASEAN leaders may now 
discuss the proposal in late 2007. 
33 Indeed, no aspect of finance is among ASEAN’s current “Priority Sectors for Economic Integration” comprising 
12 industrial and service sectors, see http://www.aseansec.org/Fact Sheet/AEC/2007-AEC-002.pdf (accessed Mar. 
21, 2007). Similarly, no mention of finance was made at the most recent ASEAN economic ministers meeting in 
August 2006. That ASEAN members elect to keep finance under local control may also reflect a perceived 
competitive disadvantage against global financial intermediaries. 
34 The Bangkok Summit Declaration of 1995, available at http://www.aseansec.org/5189.htm (accessed Mar. 21, 
2007). 
35 Ministerial Understanding on ASEAN Cooperation in Finance, available at http://www.aseansec.org/1939.htm 
(accessed Mar. 21, 2007). 
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rather than be restrained by others.36 The qualification is less an advance in regional governance 
than acknowledgement that financially underdeveloped states may lack the means or wish to 
engage in joint policies. Wholly new initiatives must be sanctioned by all members. The 
activities to which the states are urged to participate are stated briefly and without the “functional 
specificity” that one leading early theorist of regionalism considered as “causally related to the 
intensity of integration.”37 The intention was rehearsed at the peak of the Asian financial crisis 
in December 1997 when, in a forward looking statement, ASEAN heads of government 
undertook to:  
promote financial sector liberalization and closer cooperation in money and 
capital market [sic.], tax, insurance and customs matters as well as closer 
consultations in macroeconomic and financial policies.38  
 
More generally, ASEAN and ASEAN+3 states have been unprepared to relinquish the high 
degree of national policy control that is a corollary of weak or non-existent regional institutions 
and organizations. This may be distinguished from an absence of regional governance similar to 
the concept of “pre-governance”39 inasmuch as it represents deliberate choice rather than a 
formative period that tends to induce greater regional governance. It includes effective authority 
in governance given to certain non-state actors, especially in national banking sectors. Thus the 
extent of regional integration may be thought consistent with shared norms, whether deliberately 
adopted, as with the consensuality and mutual non-interference of the ASEAN Way and of 
making paramount other aspects of state policy, or indirect, such as the pivotal role in 
governance of commercial and banking interests. The organization of Asian capitalism in the 
developmental state model has been effective serially in Japan, South Korea and China in this 
respect, characterized by close directional relationships between the state and leading 
commercial interests.40 It has been asserted that: 
authority structures in the Asia Pacific serve the interests of dominant actors and 
statebusiness [sic.] coalitions, and that these actors are organized into informal 
networks of power, that is, particular informal modes of regional governance, 
                                                        
36 Id., art. 5. 
37 ERNST HAAS, International Integration: The European and the Universal Process, 15 INT. ORGAN. 3, 372 (1961). 
38 ASEAN Vision 2020, 1997, available at http://www.aseansec.org/1814.htm (accessed Mar. 21, 2007). 
39 See PAYNE, supra note 26.  
40 See especially S. GORDON REDDING, THE SPIRIT OF CHINESE CAPITALISM (W. de Gruyter, 1990).  
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serving private as well as public interests.41 
This institutional involvement of non-state actors in Asian governance is distinct from the more 
general proposition that international economic activities of all non-state participants may 
contribute to governance.42 
 
The most dramatic subsuming of regionalism to national policy objectives is seen in the region’s 
accumulation of international reserves since 2000, partly a consequence of the primacy of 
national exchange rate policy over financial integration and regional market development. The 
shared commitments and policies implicit in financial regionalism are constrained by national 
objectives.43 The relative forcefulness of national policy has long been recognized in the context 
of regional integration:  
Organizations with an economic mandate short of creating a common market or 
free trade area have great difficulty in influencing the policies of their members.44  
Yet most states adopted similar national post-crisis policies and risk averse asset accumulation 
that would appear to be conducive to cooperation. While a relatively modest degree of 
integration might impact on existing arrangements for governance, it seems that greater 
connectivity and interdependence among both Asian states and sub-state participants does not 
signify greater financial integration. Regional institutions and organizations require shared 
objectives among their founders, as well as mutual interdependence.45 
 
III.  Factors Encouraging Financial Cooperation and Integration 
 
Four factors have encouraged discussions and initiatives concerning Asian financial cooperation, 
integration and governance in the last decade. These relate especially to the 1997-98 financial 
crisis, but also to growing economic integration, developmental issues, and certain political 
                                                        
41 FREDRIK SODERBAUM, Modes of Regional Governance in Africa: Neoliberalism, Sovereignty Boosting, and 
Shadow Networks, 10 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 419-436 (2004). 
42 JOSEPH NYE & ROBERT KEOHANE, Transnational Relations and World Politics: an Introduction, 25 INT. ORGAN. 
3, 329-349 (1971). See also infra sec. V.C. 
43 This is illustrated by the portion of ASEAN+3 international reserves pooled in a regional integration initiative 
representing only 0.15 percent of the total when created at end-2005, see infra sec. IV.C.1. 
44 ERNST HAAS, The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing, 24 (4) INT. 
ORGAN. 616 (1970).  
45 ROBERT KEOHANE, From Interdependence and Institutions to Globalization and Governance, in POWER AND 
GOVERNANCE IN A PARTIALLY GLOBALIZED WORLD 1-23 (Routledge, 2002).  
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influences. The means by which these factors encouraged integration are relevant to the policy 
formation processes customarily used by Asia’s regional bodies. 
 
A.  Crisis Imperatives 
 
The 1997-98 financial crisis has had an enduring impact on national economies and the approach 
to policy formation. The economic and social dislocation provoked in South Korea and Southeast 
Asia by the dissipation of market confidence produced a concern among state actors that Asia 
lacked national and regional crisis remedies, since only non-Asian organizations such as the IMF 
were able to provide credit infusions sufficient to stem the draining of external resources. The 
view was most clearly voiced within ASEAN and by Japan.46 The crisis also induced a lasting 
risk aversion among policymakers fearful of similar instability. While this disposition initially 
helped induce limited financial reforms in individual economies, it has also prevented the 
introduction of significant regional solutions that might involve financial integration.  
 
A further controversy arose soon after the crisis in the appraisal of external capital controls. 
China and Malaysia maintained or introduced over this period barriers to the free movement of 
capital, contrary to the customary advice of transnational organizations and to which neither took 
heed. Each suffered less material falls in output and financial asset values after 1997-98, while 
the crisis was most severe in its impact on states such as Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand 
that had minimal controls on capital inflows.47 This is not to imply simple causation from capital 
mobility to external vulnerability, but these examples were sufficient to encourage other states to 
see the policies of the Washington Consensus as deleterious to recovery,48 and gave weight to 
national norms at the expense of a more regional orientation. It is clear that financial integration 
as indicated by capital mobility is entombed for regional policymakers as a condition that 
contributed to the financial crisis and the contagion that made its effects so severe. Such 
                                                        
46 And induced officials in Japan to propose certain new regional institutions, including an Asian Monetary Fund, 
see SHIGEKO HAYASHI, JAPAN AND EAST ASIAN MONETARY REGIONALISM: TOWARDS A PROACTIVE LEADERSHIP 
ROLE 82-102 (Routledge, 2006). 
47 China’s post-crisis economic and financial experience may also have been protected by a substantial currency 
devaluation in 1994. 
48 See supra note 22. See also ASLI DEMIRGÜÇ-KUNT & ENRICA DETRAGIACHE, FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION AND 
FINANCIAL FRAGILITY 12 (World Bank Working Paper No. 1917, 1998), available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/Workpapers/WPS1900series/wps1917/wps1917.pdf (accessed Mar. 
21, 2007). 
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integration has therefore been a low priority for ASEAN+3 actors. 
 
The crisis exposed helplessness within Asia’s regional organizations. This reflected the scale of 
its severity, as well as limited prior attention to regional financial structure and resources. In 
1997 no Asian organization was able to provide support to any state, however temporarily, 
leading to the irony that Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand faced an invasiveness towards 
national policymaking, especially through credit conditions, that were contrary to all ASEAN 
precepts. Short-term IMF credit was essential but given on output-reducing terms and without 
concern for non-interference in state governance. Thailand first sought liquidity assistance from 
Japan in early 1997 but no mechanism existed to allow meaningful support, and neither Japan 
nor the United States wished to abandon the conditionality of funding associated with IMF 
programs, not least to preserve their own influence and advance their own interests. This impasse 
led to suggestions for new regional institutions to address similar problems, notably in Japan’s 
proposals for an Asian Monetary Fund as an alternative to the IMF, but the initiative was 
unsuccessful and subsequent policy discussions on these issues have been consistently impeded 
by the United States whenever possible.49 
 
Thus the crisis not only revealed weaknesses in national financial systems, but also in imperfect 
and entrenched regional economic and financial linkages that made every domestic economy 
vulnerable to contagion from systemic shocks. Its aftermath produced discrete national reforms 
intended to bolster recovery and improve crisis avoidance. These sought to improve the 
effectiveness of national financial systems and alter the extent of state involvement in finance, 
but with the exception of South Korea and Malaysia, most changes were modest, especially in 
legal and regulatory systems. State influence persists in individual financial sectors and the 
burgeoning results of currency management have diluted the incentives for domestic or regional 
financial reform. 
 
Finally, the crisis induced the only known attempt to relax ASEAN’s doctrine of mutual 
non-interference: Thailand proposed in 1997-98 a policy of “flexible engagement” to signify 
deliberate interaction among member states. The requirements and implications were not fully 
                                                        
49 A narrative of Japan’s policy response to the financial crisis appears in HAYASHI, supra note 46, at 82-102. 
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developed but it was clear that the change recognized that ASEAN members faced a common 
assault in the form of rapidly depreciating currencies and the withdrawal of international credit 
that might be better resisted through cooperation more advanced than that contemplated by 
ASEAN precepts. The proposal received minimal support and was abandoned as unworkable. 
The consensus that rejected flexible engagement in 1998 was described as:  
the vision of ASEAN 2020 in which there will be a free flow of goods, services 
and investments, a freer flow of capital,50 equitable economic development and 
reduced poverty and socioeconomic disparities. This closer economic integration 
will be achieved, among other strategies, by fully implementing [the ASEAN Free 
Trade Area].51 
The suggestion that capital mobility might eventually be freer acknowledges the limits that 
members set for financial integration. Nothing in these remarks addresses the usefulness of 
Asia’s regional institutions in times of crisis. It is implicit in the stance that ASEAN will not 
engage in financial rule-making. With ASEAN+3 steadily superseding ASEAN in high-level 
policy formation, the chances are slender that flexible engagement will revive, given China’s 
adherence to the existing approach and an ongoing nationalistic hiatus in Thailand.52  
 
B.  Economic Influences 
 
In the absence of national restrictions, expanding trade and investment might be expected to 
increase the demand for financial instruments and their scope of use, for example, in trade 
finance, direct investment funding (including in support of mergers and acquisitions), and 
requirements for banking, treasury or cash management products. While many Asian public and 
private sector users have access to sophisticated financial instruments and applications in 
international markets and major currencies, the extent of such activity within the region or 
denominated in local currencies is materially lower than suggested by those flows of trade and 
investment. This is the most apparent systemic result of relatively undeveloped financial 
integration. Unsatisfied demand for financial instruments and systems associated with economic 
                                                        
50 Emphasis added. 
51 Jayakumar, supra note 29. 
52 Notwithstanding the common objectives expressed in ASEAN’s Vision 2020, see supra note 32.  
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integration highlights an array of impediments to regional and national financial activity.53 
Section IV outlines initiatives that have addressed certain such impediments, none yet with full 
success. Many problems remain at national level for which a consensus on regional reform could 
be valuable.  
 
C.  Developmental Issues 
 
Part of Asia’s post-2000 crisis response has been the precautionary acquisition of non-Asian 
financial assets, which is closely connected to national currency management over the same 
period. Thus state actors now control very substantial foreign reserves but the scale of their 
accumulation has prompted concerns as to risk concentration, and whether a portion of those 
resources might be allocated to Asian assets and support for welfare or infrastructural 
development. Furthermore, most Asian economies have comparatively high rates of 
precautionary savings. Individuals tend to hold much of their savings as deposits, and high bank 
liquidity has often been associated with poor credit risk assessment or indiscriminate or directed 
lending. A development imperative thus focuses on allowing deeper and more transparent 
financial markets to allow broader uses of foreign reserves within the region and apply domestic 
savings better to support capital investment. High profile examples include the growing trend of 
government investment corporations, modeled on Singaporean and Gulf state experiences. 
Applying resources in support of regional development is distinct from the issue of encouraging 
development through crisis avoidance.  
 
D.  Political Factors 
 
Politics is so pervasive an influence on the extent and character of financial integration as to 
drive it beyond the direct scope of this article. Both the relative competitive position of states and 
their historic rivalries are highly significant in discussions on regional integration. Currently, the 
growing influence of China is arguably encouraging smaller states (and to some extent Japan as 
well) to favor enhanced mutual cooperation for protective reasons, including through balancing 
                                                        
53 For example, restrictions on non-residents holding money market instruments, see DOUGLAS ARNER, PAUL LEJOT 
& S. GHON RHEE, IMPEDIMENTS TO CROSS-BORDER INVESTMENTS IN ASIAN BONDS (Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2006). 
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by involving ASEAN+6 states (India, Australia, New Zealand). Similar thinking argues the need 
to offset the political-economic weight of the European Union and United States and their 
respective currency areas. Discussions of economic and financial cooperation and integration and 
governance issues between ASEAN and ASEAN+3 actors are significantly impacted by both 
arguments, with ASEAN+6 discussions a direct result. At the same time, such efforts may be 
dispelled by the increasing number of bilateral trade agreements within the region, 
notwithstanding the constructive view that Asia’s “noodle bowl” network of such bilateral trade 
agreements may be building blocks for universal free trade.54 
 
Other external pressures from the European Union and United States have prevented ASEAN 
from acting collectively, for example in representations on its admission of Myanmar, and in the 
response to Japanese post-crisis regional initiatives.55 More constructive political forces may 
arise in security cooperation, seen recently as one of “three pillars” that might support more 
intense Asian political integration,56 and it has been argued that ASEAN “has generated 
significant benefits in the form of confidence-building activities even though the gains from 
economic collaboration have been minimal”57 with such benefits apparent in political and 
security matters. 
 
                                                        
54 RICHARD BALDWIN, MULTILATERALISING REGIONALISM: SPAGHETTI BOWLS AS BUILDING BLOCS ON THE PATH 
TO GLOBAL FREE TRADE (NBER Working Paper No. 12545, 2006), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w12545 
(accessed Mar. 21, 2007). The same author has written about inherent weaknesses of Asian regional gatherings and 
organizations in economic integration, because 
The fragility of the East Asian [trade] system stems from the extreme interdependence of nations’ 
competitiveness, the lack of WTO discipline, and the lack of top-level [regional organizational or institutional] 
management [to substitute for WTO discipline].  
RICHARD BALDWIN, Managing the Noodle Bowl: The Fragility of East Asian Regionalism, at 2, CEPR DISCUSSION 
PAPER NO. 5561 (2006), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=912265 (accessed Mar. 21, 2007). 
55 See supra sec. III.A. An alternative view is that Japan has “limited incentives to invest in regional cooperation,” 
see NATASHA HAMILTON-HART, FINANCIAL COOPERATION AND POLITICAL ECONOMY at 132 in CURLEY & THOMAS, 
ADVANCING EAST ASIAN REGIONALISM, supra note 30, due to its having “an economy still much more domestically 
orientated than that [sic.] of its neighbours,” id., and since Japanese cooperation proposals (such as those for 
monetary cooperation or an Asian monetary fund) stems from “relatively insulated policy-makers and academics” 
who lack support at home. Id. However insulated may be the root of such proposals, this seems a 
mischaracterization of the scale of the Japanese external sector based upon its size relative to other far smaller Asian 
economies, and neglects the interest of Japan’s commercial interests in advancing all forms of regional financial 
integration.  
56 MELISSA CURLEY & NICHOLAS THOMAS, Introduction at 17-19 in CURLEY & THOMAS, ADVANCING EAST ASIAN 
REGIONALISM, supra note 30. 
57 See e.g., RAVENHILL, supra note 31, at 27; EVELYN GOH & AMITAV ACHARYA, The ASEAN Regional Forum and 
Security Regionalism: Comparing Chinese and American Positions, in ADVANCING EAST ASIAN REGIONALISM, 
supra note 30, at 96-115. 
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E.  Transmission Mechanisms 
 
Convergence in economic policy formation and outcomes of the type identified as financial 
integration require incentives and workable transmission channels. One such non-exhaustive 
characterization suggests four distinct mechanisms through which convergence among states is 
made effective, namely policy emulation, harmonization, penetration and the existence of elite 
policy groups,58 against which regional channels can be seen to be comparatively weak. 
 
IV.  Financial Integration and Development Initiatives  
 
Asian financial integration has been subject to considerable but equivocal attention, reflecting 
the paradox described in section II that financial integration lags economic integration. Here, the 
region’s transnational organizations are important for two reasons. First, they represent extant 
regional institutions and their limitations illustrate an uncommitted approach to regional 
governance; second, they have supported national actors with funding and technical assistance 
for financial reform. Initiatives to encourage financial integration have in particular addressed 
trade in financial services, cooperation in external monetary operations, or capital market 
reform.59  
 
There is no single view as to whether Asian financial development is more appropriately directed 
at domestic or regional issues. The Washington Consensus traditionally saw domestic market 
development as contributing a greater benefit in utility and crisis prevention, and suggested that 
regional development is secondary. Asian policymakers may be more malleable but the historical 
result of such differences has been for reform to arise in the forum of least resistance. Thus 
ASEAN+3 has addressed regional development issues to which the United States was opposed 
while APEC dealt with proposals that the United States might endorse, including domestic 
market development. In the second case, post-crisis proposals were developed in APEC and the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) to establish a well-capitalized regional financial guarantor to 
provide credit enhancement for structured transactions but lapsed due to opposition of non-Asian 
                                                        
58 See BENNETT, supra note 19. 
59 Japan’s strategies for financial cooperation including reforming taxation through a web of new treaties are 
beyond the scope of this analysis.  
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participants or ADB shareholders.60 This article’s view is that both domestic and regional 
approaches to reform have value and may be mutually reinforcing. 
 
A.  Trade in Financial Services 
 
Limited growth has occurred in regional trade in financial services and an improvement is likely 
to occur only slowly. This sub-section discusses cooperation in financial services liberalization, 
the structure of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and APEC’s interest in an international 
framework for financial services liberalization. It also examines one aspect of a proposed Asian 
Economic Community (often labeled ASEAN+6) embracing ASEAN+3, Australia, India and 
New Zealand, that may become a framework for wider cooperation. It does so in the context of 
governance issues and does not test the extent of AFTA usage, or tariffs and non-tariff barriers 
maintained for declared reasons of national interest.61 
 
1.  AFTA 
 
ASEAN activity includes heads of government summits, ministerial meetings and work in ad hoc 
committees. The organization has never been prominent in economic affairs, although 
persistence has helped inculcate a positive image as a collaborative forum. ASEAN finance 
ministers first met to discuss regional cooperation in 1967.62 Substantive cooperation was 
minimal for some years but in 1995 ASEAN’s heads of governments declared that it:  
shall move towards greater economic integration by building on existing 
economic cooperation activities, initiating new areas of cooperation, and 
promoting closer cooperation in international fora.63  
Developmental diversity and differences in economic systems hinder effective collaboration, 
especially in the larger ASEAN+3 group, despite which ASEAN may have assumed a more 
significant role in economic regionalism since the Asian crisis, influenced also by European and 
North American economic regionalism and the re-emerging force of China’s economy. 
                                                        
60 ASEAN+3 also failed to support the proposal, see supra sec. II. Note that a regional guarantor would have 
competed with commercial monoline insurers, most of which are US domiciled. 
61 Entrenched state protectionism will limit the use of AFTA agreements, see BALDWIN, supra note 54 at 36-37. 
62 Producing the Ministerial Understanding on ASEAN Cooperation in Finance, see supra sec. II & note 35. 
63 Bangkok Summit Declaration of 1995, supra note 35.  
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Any conceptual success in AFTA obscures institutional problems compared to more mature 
regional trade organizations. It is administered by neither rule nor principle, and maintains an 
informal orientation that emphasizes consultation rather than judicial procedure or settlement. 
This makes AFTA non-cohesive rather than rigorous or integrated. AFTA began in 1992 as part 
of a wider ASEAN protocol on economic cooperation,64 the breadth of language of which makes 
it doubtful that it constitutes a treaty among signatories. 65  AFTA’s substantive initiating 
agreement sets objectives for removing tariffs and non-tariff barriers,66 and later modifications 
have made the elimination of all import duties by 2015 a goal.67 Similar objectives have been 
adopted within ASEAN+3 and thus China-ASEAN, South Korea-ASEAN and Japan-ASEAN 
free trade areas are all in the process of formation.68 
 
2.  AFAS Financial Services Sector Commitments 
 
ASEAN’s 1995 Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS)69 seeks to reduce barriers to trade in 
services, requiring members to negotiate to lift restrictions in specific market segments and to 
some degree expand upon their commitments under the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS), discussed further in section V. The commitments are not confined to allowing 
foreign access only to ASEAN members. The following table summarizes ASEAN financial 
services market access commitments under the ASEAN framework. 
 
                                                        
64  AFTA appears in only one 15 clauses of the Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic 
Cooperation, 1992, available at http://www.aseansec.org/12374.htm (accessed Mar. 21, 2007). 
65  JACQUES PELKMANS, ASEAN and APEC, A Triumph of the ‘Asian Way’? in REGIONALISM AND 
MULTILATERALISM AFTER THE URUGUAY ROUND: CONVERGENCE, DIVERGENCE AND INTERACTION 211 (Paul 
Demaret, Jean-Francois Bellis & Gonzalo Garcia Jimenez, eds., European Inter-University Press, 1997). 
66 Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme for AFTA, 1995, available at 
http://www.aseansec.org/12375.htm (accessed Mar. 21, 2007).  
67 Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand intend do so by 2010. However, all 
members may unilaterally retain tariffs on goods they deem sensitive to national interests. 
68 See also BALDWIN, supra note 54.  
69 1995, available at http://www.aseansec.org/6628.htm (accessed Mar. 21, 2007), art. IV. Certain financial sector 
requirements commitments were strengthened in 2002-03: Protocol to Amend the ASEAN Financial Services 
Agreement, available at http://www.aseansec.org/AFAS_Amendment_Protocol.pdf (accessed Mar. 21, 2007). 
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Table 1: ASEAN Financial Services Sector Commitments 
 Market segment  limits to foreign investment 
Brunei Financial advisory and ancillary 
services  
 
Insurance and retrocession 
Official approval required 
 
 
Official approval required 
Cambodia Lending and deposit-taking 
 
Life and non-life insurance 
 
 
 
Reinsurance and retrocession 
 
 
All payment and monetary 
transmission services 
 
Guarantees and commitments 
Permitted through licensed intermediaries 
 
Natural or juridical persons may enter contracts 
only with licensed insurance companies in 
Cambodia 
 
Companies must reinsure 20% of their risk with 
state reinsurer Cambodian Re until end-2008 
 
Permitted through authorized financial institutions 
as banks 
 
Not proscribed until related law is established 
Indonesia Commercial banking business Limited to two sub-branches and two auxiliary 
offices for foreign banks and two sub branches for 
joint venture banks 
Laos Insurance 
 
 
 
 
Financial leasing, payment and 
money transmission services 
 
Securities, money broking, 
settlement and clearing services, 
advisory and auxiliary financial 
services 
Authorized insurance companies must trade 
through a corporate entity with a minimum 
registered capital and a parent guarantee lodged 
with a bank resident in Laos 
 
No limit 
 
 
Unlimited until a related law is established 
Malaysia Insurance  
 
Advisory, intermediation and other 
auxiliary financial services 
Foreign shareholding not to exceed 30 percent. 
 
Investment advice requires a physical commercial 
presence; other services must be jointly 
undertaken with commercial banks or merchant 
banks in Malaysia 
Myanmar Loss adjustment  
 
Actuarial services 
No restriction 
 
No limits 
Philippines Insurance, reinsurance and 
ancillary insurance  
 
 
 
Broker-dealer 
Foreign interests may control 60 percent of 
domestic insurers (40 percent of ancillary 
insurance ventures); no more than one third of 
directors may be foreign nationals. 
 
Permitted as foreign equity participation in 
domestic corporations or a branch office. 
Prior registration required for broker-dealers;  
Foreign broker-dealers limited to two branches 
Singapore Insurance 
 
 
Foreign interests may control 49 percent of 
domestic insurers; no restrictions on new 
insurance licenses and representative offices. 
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Securities 
 
Bank and merchant bank exchange membership 
must be held through subsidiaries 
Thailand Lending and deposit-taking; 
leasing; money transmission; 
guarantees 
  
Securities trading and issuance; 
asset management; advisory, 
intermediation and other auxiliary 
financial services; financial 
advisory 
No restrictions on bank representative offices; full 
market access limited to acquisitions of existing 
licensed companies but licenses may also be 
granted to new entrants; foreign interests may 
control the entire issued share capital of banks. 
Foreign nationals restricted as directors of 
securities dealers, depending on the extent of 
foreign shareholding.  
 
Vietnam Bank guarantees 
 
 
 
 
Banking and other financial 
services 
Foreign bank branches and joint ventures may 
issue guarantees in limited circumstances, 
covering mainly overseas interests or foreign 
funded ventures in Vietnam.  
 
Vietnam may limit equity participation by foreign 
credit institutions in incorporated Vietnamese 
state-owned banks; total foreign equity in 
joint-stock commercial banks may not exceed 
30% of chartered capital; foreign bank branch is 
not allowed to place ATMs at locations other than 
its branch office 
  
Overall, ASEAN agreements and AFTA obligations differ little from specific WTO financial 
sector commitments, from which some are indistinguishable, including those of Brunei, 
Cambodia and Indonesia,70 and the marginal access to foreign interests in most cases is limited. 
Related issues are discussed further in section V. 
 
3.  APEC  
 
Meetings of APEC finance ministers began in 1993, prior to which Japan and the United States 
resisted giving attention to economic matters, preferring that economic policy coordination 
remain the domain of the Group of Seven industrialized nations (G-7) and the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). APEC involvement in trade in financial 
services issues is circumscribed and accords with the characterization of APEC as ineffectual,71 
favoring hesitation against institutionalization or the use of rules. The group’s diversity of 
interests ensures that informality is central in all proceedings. Such a governance vacuum 
minimizes APEC’s scope to contribute to economic or financial integration and related legal 
                                                        
70 See respectively GATS/SC/95, GATS/SC/43/Suppl.3, and WT/ACC/KHM/21/Add.2 /. 
71 See RAVENHILL, supra note 31. 
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reform: while APEC was thought an effective forum for economic concerns prior to the 1997-98 
crisis, it has since become viewed as less successful, so that emphasis in governance and 
resources have shifted to ASEAN+3, the WTO and ASEAN+6. 
 
APEC voiced support for consultations on banking and securities regulation in 1994, and in the 
same year issued guidelines for regional investment. 72  In 1996 it endorsed regulatory 
cooperation and prudential regulation of financial markets in accord with international standards. 
During the 1997-98 crisis, APEC pronounced itself in favor of stable capital flows, domestic 
financial market development, efforts to promote financial stability, and work to strengthen 
regulation of international financial intermediaries and increase cooperation among regulators to 
lessen global systemic risks.73 No objection can be made to these pronouncements but APEC’s 
contribution to tangible financial integration has been negligible due to its lack of institutional 
authority and political fragmentation.  
 
4.  ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement 
 
Efforts to improve the China-ASEAN free trade agreement began in 1995,74 progressed in 2000 
to an intention to study integration, including a formal free trade area,75 and led to the creation 
of an expert group for ASEAN-China economic cooperation in 2001. ASEAN and China 
concluded a Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation (ACFTA) in 
2002,76 and a further agreement covering the trade in goods in 2004.77 These agreements 
                                                        
72  See Joint Statement, Sixty APEC Ministerial Meeting, 1994, available at 
http://www.apec.org/apec/ministerial_statements/annual_ministerial/1994_6th_apec_ministerial.html (accessed Mar. 
21, 2007). APEC’s Non-binding Investment Principles issued in 1994 are not only non-binding but insubstantive, 
available at  http://www.apec.org/apec/ministerial_statements/annual_ministerial/1994_6th_apec_ministerial.html 
(accessed Mar. 21, 2007). On capital mobility, the document states only that “Member economies accept that 
regulatory and institutional barriers to the outflow of investment will be minimized” but at the same time foreign 
and domestic investors shall be treated alike subject to “exceptions as provided for in domestic laws, regulations and 
policies.” Id. There is no more recent or specific APEC examination of cross-border investment. 
73 By the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO) and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS). 
74 At the first Meeting of Common Commission of Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and ASEAN. 
75 Proposed by China at a China-ASEAN summit meeting. 
76 Amended in 2003, see Protocol to Amend the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation 
between ASEAN and China, available at http://www.aseansec.org/15157.htm (accessed Mar. 21, 2007).  
77 Agreement on Trade in Goods of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between 
ASEAN and China, available at http://www.aseansec.org/16646.htm (accessed Mar. 21, 2007). This includes an 
agreement on dispute settlement mechanisms, see http://www.aseansec.org/16635.htm (accessed Mar. 21, 2007). 
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stipulate that a free trade area will come into effect in 2010 for China and ASEAN’s five 
founding members and expand in 2015 to include Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam. 
ACFTA has four objectives: strengthen and enhance economic, trade and investment cooperation; 
liberalize and promote trade in goods and services; explore new areas of cooperation; and 
facilitate economic integration and reduce gaps in relative development.78 ACFTA covers trade 
in goods and services, investment and dispute resolution, but no aspect of intellectual property. 
The agreement commits its signatories to negotiate further liberalization of trade in services, 
including specific sectors and rules for foreign investment.79  
 
ACFTA and AFTA are independent: The establishment of ACFTA represents a separate free 
trade agreement between China and each of ASEAN’s members, and requires a dedicated 
administrative structure since ASEAN’s resources cannot meet a greater burden. While a future 
ACFTA standing body could become a cooperative bridge between ASEAN and China with 
respect to trade, organizational aspects of ACFTA to date lag the development of trade between 
members, for no formal ACFTA agency exists and negotiations are handled in an ad hoc 
committee with support temporarily provided by ASEAN’s secretariat, as it does for AFTA. 
 
B.  Monetary Cooperation  
 
Regional monetary cooperation is mainly evidenced by ASEAN+3 short-term credit lines. As 
noted above, an Asian Monetary Fund was mooted during the 1997-98 crisis when certain Asian 
states required credit to replace lost international reserves but was dismissed upon intense US 
opposition.80 Nonetheless, the objectives of a putative regional fund were raised in ASEAN+3 in 
April 2006 in discussions of a possible long-term currency alliance and monetary union. The 
ASEAN+3 Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) sought in 2000 to promote cooperation through the 
institution of bilateral currency swap agreements among central banks.81 Today’s network of 
sovereign bilateral credit lines has two roots:82 collaborative foreign exchange swap lines set up 
                                                        
78 Framework Agreement, supra note 76, arts. 1 & 2.  
79 Id., arts. 4 & 5.  
80 See supra note 46. 
81  See Joint Ministerial Statement of the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers Meeting, available at 
http://www.aseansec.org/635.htm (accessed Mar. 21, 2007). 
82 Counterparty risk is taken here as sovereign whether it involves a central bank or finance ministry.  
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by ASEAN’s five original members, and a series of securities repurchase (repo) lines initiated by 
the Executives’ Meeting of East Asia-Pacific Central Banks (EMEAP) as a precautionary 
reaction to the 1994 Mexican financial crisis.83 These origins also reveal two aims, the first 
political in showing the group’s robustness, and the second intended to assist economic policy. 
 
ASEAN’s arrangement began in 1977 as a modest US$100 million set of foreign exchange swap 
lines, facilitating simultaneous spot sale and forward purchases of local currency for US dollars 
among five central banks to assist a member in temporary need of external liquidity.84 The 
scheme was extended, expanded, and may have been utilized once each by Indonesia, Malaysia, 
the Philippines and Thailand between 1979 and 1981, and on a second occasion by the 
Philippines in 1992, in each case for modest amounts.85 The arrangement’s limited size and 
conditionality (requiring a prior IMF arrangement) prevented its use in 1997 when the members’ 
external positions came most under pressure. 
 
With these swap arrangements came a series of bilateral repurchase lines among EMEAP 
members, the first introduced in 1995-97. Japan was active in their creation, partly due to its 
interest in promoting regional building blocks distinct from those involving other G-7 members. 
The amounts involved were made public only for those involving Japan, each being of US$1.0 
billion.86 The lines allowed a participant to raise major currency liquidity for intervention or 
other purposes by discounting with a fellow member high-grade securities held as international 
reserves, most commonly US government securities. Market practice knows several contexts in 
which the use of repurchase lines is prolific among both commercial and central banks, but 
EMEAP’s repurchase lines are analogous to the conduct of money market operations by central 
banks seeking to influence domestic liquidity, including cases where a central bank accepts 
                                                        
83 Reported by RAMON MORENO, Dealing with Currency Speculation in the Asian Pacific Basin, FED. RESERVE 
BANK SAN FRANCISCO ECON. LETTER, 97-10 (Apr. 11, 1997). See also infra sec. IV.C.2. 
84 Such lines are a form of credit that become loans in the event of non-payment at maturity. Conforming with 
commercial practice, swaps might extend for up to 90 days, each once renewable with counterparty consent and the 
absence of a competing need. 
85 See C. RANDALL HENNING, EAST ASIAN FINANCIAL COOPERATION 14 (Institute for International Economics, 
2002), citing unnamed Thai sources. A United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
(UNESCAP) report claims that the arrangement “has been extensively used” but this is unsupported and implausible, 
see SEOK-DONG WANG & LENE ANDERSEN, Regional financial cooperation in East Asia: the Chiang Mai Initiative 
and Beyond, BULLETIN ON ASIA-PACIFIC PERSPECTIVES 2002/03 90 (UNESCAP, 2003). 
86 See MORENO, supra note 83. 
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collateral in the form of prescribed securities and becomes a lender of last resort. Usage of 
EMEAP lines has no direct consequence for domestic credit expansion. 
 
Excluding those involving Australia and New Zealand, two sets of lines thus evolved into more 
complex agreements heralded by CMI.87 This spurred ASEAN members (now a group of ten) to 
raise their total swap arrangements to US$1.0 billion (later US$2.0 billion) and for China, Japan 
and South Korea each to pledge to maintain bilateral credit lines among themselves and with 
each ASEAN member, allowing currency swaps and securities repurchases.88 The initiative is 
not an agreement but an expression of intent, making ASEAN+3 a catalyst to bilateral 
arrangements already customary among developed economies. 
 
CMI’s results blend purposeful display with practical confusion.89 First, most of the 16 bilateral 
lines established by China, Japan and South Korea90 entail contractual terms that make IMF 
sanction mandatory for most swap usage, not merely the satisfaction of conditions precedent 
identical to those customarily demanded by the IMF.91 It would have been impossible for CMI’s 
expanded lines to have been drawn in the Asian crisis prior to an applicant having agreed terms 
for IMF support, by which time any need would have become redundant. In a similar instance in 
mid-1997, Thailand may have used a precursor swap line with Japan.92 If so, this failed to 
influence markets intent on selling the baht since drawing from a finite source could only 
encourage the seller.  
 
Second, although the post-CMI lines provided by China, Japan and South Korea allow for 
                                                        
87 See supra note 85. The CMI is subject to no public agreement to which all its adherents are party. 
88 Implementation of the agreement by Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam has to date been waived.  
89 This view has support in official circles in China and Japan, for example, INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY AFFAIRS (MINISTRY OF FINANCE OF JAPAN), REPORT SUMMARY OF STUDIES ON TOWARD [SIC.] A 
REGIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE FOR EAST ASIA (2004), available at 
http://www.mof.go.jp/jouhou/kokkin/ASEAN+3research.htm (accessed Mar. 21, 2007). 
90  Totaling US$75 billion equivalent as at May 4, 2006. Source: Ministry of Finance of Japan, 
http://www.mof.go.jp/english/if/regional_financial_cooperation.htm (accessed Mar. 21, 2007). 
91 In May 2005 ASEAN+3 raised the portion available unconditionally under post-CMI swap lines from 10 to 20 
percent of the total “in order to better cope with sudden market irregularities” but stressed this represented no 
contradiction that “the international financial arrangements and other disciplined conditions would be firmly 
maintained.” See The Joint Ministerial Statement of the 8th ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers’ Meeting, May 4, 2005, 
available at http://www.aseansec.org/17448.htm (accessed Mar. 21, 2007). It is arguable that IMF compliance would 
be demanded for usage even had it not then made credit commitments to a hopeful user. 
92 The Economist, May 10, 2001 (cited by HENNING, supra note 85).  
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securities repurchases, this is now seen by all participants as outmoded and given little attention 
compared to the swap provisions.93 The largest non-cash component of Asia’s international 
reserves is held in US government securities, an archetypal broad and deep bond market. Critics 
suggest that the liquidity available through repurchases could not compete with so profound a 
source.94 More attention is now paid by participants and commentators to swap operations and 
availability. However, this approach neglects shocks not focused on Asia, as in October 1987, 
when for a week following sizeable stock market losses the US treasury market was highly 
illiquid, frequently closed to foreign participants and employable only by negotiation among 
primary dealers. Infra-Asian repurchase lines could have insulatory value in such circumstances 
by promoting non-domestic liquidity, even if the region’s reserves are concentrated in US dollar 
assets. Prevailing conditions have changed markedly with the substantial accumulation of 
reserves in ASEAN+3. That the 1995-97 repurchase lines were barely used, if at all, in the 1997 
crisis was due to a scarcity of collateral or to the participants simultaneously suffering similar 
problems not amenable to mutual resolution. 
 
CMI’s outcome is said by ASEAN+3 to be regional but its facilities are entirely bilateral in 
creation and use, despite involving a gesture to harmonization and shared views of crisis 
avoidance. ASEAN ministers declared in 1999 that it: 
shall adopt a more proactive role at various international and regional fora to 
ensure that its interests and priorities are given due consideration in any proposal 
to reform the international financial architecture.95 
Market practitioners see the post-2000 CMI swap line framework as inconsequential and its 
significance mainly political. History suggests using swap lines other than to dampen prevailing 
volatility will at most delay the impact of selling pressure and may give confidence to the seller. 
It is ironic that CMI’s cooption of IMF conditions makes credit line usage unlikely, as some 
participants perhaps intended, and that the older repurchase lines are neglected despite their 
usefulness in crises. While CMI’s profile has little relation to its modest impact in form and scale, 
it may provide an institution to support the creation of a currency pact similar to that adopted in 
                                                        
93 Despite being similar to well-established financial derivative market collateralization practice. 
94 E.g., HENNING, supra note 85 at 22. 
95 Joint Ministerial Statement of the 3rd ASEAN Finance Ministers Meeting, Mar. 20, 1999, available at 
http://www.aseansec.org/742.htm (accessed Mar. 21, 2007). 
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Europe in the 1970s (the so-called “snake”) or a foundation upon which to build an Asian 
monetary fund. By “coincidence”, these arrangements are now labeled Asian Monetary Facilities 
or AMF. 
 
C.  Capital Market Development 
 
Post-crisis attention to regional capital market development initially focused on the debt and 
money markets but has recently begun to consider wider securities market reform.96 Work on 
debt market development has comprised three collaborative efforts: the ASEAN+3 Asian Bond 
Market Initiative (ABMI), APEC’s efforts in developing securitization, and work by members of 
the Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD).97 It also includes EMEAP central banks’ pooling of 
international reserves in two Asian Bond Funds in 2004 and 2005, with a third similar fund under 
discussion. As in similar matters, success has been limited due to the reluctance of state actors to 
cede national governance to create regional policy capital. This has been most evident in the 
supremacy of national currency policies, to the detriment of collaborative market reform and 
constraining initiatives on regional trade in financial services or monetary cooperation. Little 
effort has been made to sanction non-bank financial intermediaries holding foreign regional 
assets, although they typically enjoy far greater freedom to acquire higher rated OECD 
investments. 
 
1.  ASEAN+3, APEC and ACD 
 
APEC’s regional bond market initiative began in 2003, exploring regional market development 
and institutions to encourage financial activity. 98  Teams examined aspects of market 
development, with one seeking recommendations for securitization and credit enhancement 
                                                        
96 ASEAN+3 is studying cooperation among exchanges and regulators to encouraging cross-border trading. 
97 Thailand initiated the ACD in 2002 among ASEAN+3, India and fourteen other central Asian states to explore 
regional cooperation to encourage capital market activity. The group’s visibility fell after the end of Thailand’s 
APEC chairmanship in 2004 and may vanish entirely with Thailand’s current constitutional hiatus. 
98  See Joint Ministerial Statement, Tenth APEC Finance Ministers’ Meeting, Sep. 5, 2003, available at 
http://www.apec.org/apec/ministerial_statements/sectoral_ministerial/finance/2003_finance.html (accessed Mar. 21, 
2007). 
 
30
mechanisms to improve the credit risk quality of Asian bonds.99 APEC asked if securitization 
could provide a continuous fundraising mechanism in the region and assist in the recycling of 
non-performing financial assets. The work was led by officials from Hong Kong, South Korea 
and Thailand, the first two having experience of legislation to promote structured finance. 
 
Soon afterward, ASEAN+3 commissioned similar research as part of the ABMI, with working 
groups given support from ADB resources. They investigated using securitization to increase the 
supply of debt instruments, enhancing credit risk by providing institutional credit enhancement, 
improving clearing, custody and settlement systems, developing new credit rating agencies and 
encouraging information flows, harmonizing market regulations to best practices, and removing 
legal and regulatory impediments to cross-border bond investment. The final group’s work ended 
prematurely, in an example of conflict between national and regional interests. It was charged to 
explore cross-border local currency bond issuance by multilateral agencies, governments and 
their agencies, and regional companies, the group’s convener allowed it to examine issuance only 
by multilateral agencies.100 After inaugural new issues in China and Thailand by the ADB and 
the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation (IFC), the group declared its mission ended 
and it dissolved in 2004, leaving many omissions from its original agenda. 101  In their 
contribution to governance, ASEAN’s projects generally constitute functional specificity that is 
“so trivial as to remain outside the stream of human expectations and actions vital for 
integration.”102 
 
2.  Pooled Reserves: Asian Bond Funds 
 
EMEAP’s central banks are those from ASEAN’s founding five members, plus Australia, China, 
Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand. Its non-Japan Asian members are the 
nominal sponsors of collaborative ideas developed by Hong Kong and Thai officials and 
                                                        
99 Securitization is a tool of structured finance involving the sale of loans or other financial assets, funded by the 
simultaneous sale to third party investors of new securities issued by the asset buyer, which is an insubstantive 
company or trust. See DOUGLAS ARNER, Emerging Market Economies and Government Promotion of Securitization, 
12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT. L. 505 (2002) 
100 The group was led by officials of China. 
101  Many remaining impediments are listed in ARNER, LEJOT & RHEE, IMPEDIMENTS TO CROSS-BORDER 
INVESTMENTS IN ASIAN BONDS, see supra note 53. 
102 HAAS, supra note 37, at 372.  
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implemented as the two Asian Bond Funds (ABF1 and ABF2), which are poolings of a fraction 
of international reserves. The plan had two roots: criticism of Asia massing reserves in non-Asian 
assets, and the proposition that active capital markets could provide a stabilizing resource in 
times of heightened volatility. The project had initial assistance from the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS), which was politically important given an absence of usable regional or shared 
institutions, and avoided creating a hierarchy among the participants or the unnecessary creation 
of a supervening regional steering organization. Ironically, the principal fund managers for the 
project are of British or American domicile. 
 
Both funds are indexed and involve no discretionary management. Their aggregate at inception 
was equivalent to less than 0.15 percent of the subscribers’ aggregate reserves but the project is 
innovatory in several respects. While the funds cannot directly contribute to liquidity they depart 
from traditional reserve management practice by including sub-investment grade EMEAP 
sovereign risks. ABF1 is a US$1.0 billion pooling of core currency Asian bonds held by 
EMEAP’s Asian members.103 The later ABF2 is a US$2.0 billion fund for local currency issues, 
with families of single currency exchange-traded funds and regional index funds each acquiring 
and holding sovereign and quasi-sovereign Asian securities. Hitherto, proposals to create 
regional bodies have been ambitious and not easily implemented,104 so if the more complex 
ABF2 is successful it may lead to structural regional cooperation. It has prompted the creation of 
Asia’s first exchange-traded bond fund, led two jurisdictions to permit domestic currency 
exchange-traded funds, and its regional index fund was the first non-bank intermediary to be 
granted access to China’s domestic interbank bond market.105 
 
ABF2’s single currency and regional index funds provide a means to lessen problems associated 
with direct investment in local currency instruments by most offshore investors and certain 
domestic investors, including those affecting custody, enforcement of rights, reliability of 
transfer, and taxation.106 If the plan succeeds, it will do so not overtly but by encouraging the 
                                                        
103 Many OECD central banks trade actively in liquid foreign currency debt securities but the assets held by ABF1 
are generally illiquid and represent the fund’s feasible investment universe. 
104 For example, currency cooperation pacts discussed at intervals by APEC and ASEAN. 
105 EMEAP Press Statement, “The Asian Bond Fund 2 has moved into Implementation Phase”, May 12, 2005 
available at http://www.emeap.org/ (accessed Mar. 21, 2007). 
106 See ARNER, LEJOT & RHEE, supra note 53. 
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removal of legal and regulatory constraints that currently make its objectives impossible to 
achieve. The test of the project must be whether it generates liquidity and induces new 
participants to issue, invest or trade. Yet in its first six months the sums raised from non-EMEAP 
sources amounted to only US$200 million, and it has not since succeeded in attracting material 
outside interest.107 This project is demanding because it seeks to circumvent pervasive problems 
of investor access, custody, enforcement, transfer and taxation that exist for non-bank investors 
throughout the region, but in so doing will be self-limiting as to its external impact on market 
development. Indeed, pre-establishment announcements in 2004 suggested this might be 
intentional in that ABF2 would “accelerate market and regulatory reform.”108 Unsurprisingly, no 
such commitments have been disclosed. 
 
3.  Equity Market Development and Cooperation 
 
Integration of Asia’s equity markets is almost non-existent but opportunities for regional 
collaboration may arise from the adoption of common minimum standards by domestic securities 
regulators, probably enhancing certain standards from the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO). IOSCO is an organization of wide membership that 
coordinates and leads cooperation, benchmarking and information exchange among securities 
regulators.109 Its memorandum of understanding covering interaction among regulators is a 
template for cooperation, information exchange and enforcement, and four documents first 
developed in 1998 now provide a comprehensive body of principles and standards for securities 
regulation, 110  including an internationally acceptable offering document that incorporates 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and provides the basis for the format and 
                                                        
107 “Pan Asia fund fails to excite investors,” Fin’l Times, Jun. 13, 2006. 
108 EMEAP Press Statement, “EMEAP Central Banks Announce the Launch of the Asian Bond Fund 2,” Dec. 16, 
2004, available at http://www.emeap.org/ (accessed Mar. 21, 2007). 
109 IOSCO has the widest national membership and affiliations of any transnational financial industry body, see 
http://www.iosco.org/lists/index.cfm?section=general (accessed Mar. 21, 2007). All jurisdictions considered in this 
article are full IOSCO members. IOSCO seeks to promote cooperation among regulators for the benefit of market 
openness, effectiveness and integrity of use. See http://www.iosco.org/about/ (accessed Mar. 21, 2007). 
110  Covering the objectives and principles of securities regulation; international disclosure standards for 
cross-border offerings and foreign listings; risk management and control guidance for securities firms; and 
methodologies for determining minimum capital standards for internationally active securities firms. This mission 
was set largely at the behest of the Group of Seven industrialized countries (G-7). 
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content of cross-border offering documents.111 This may in due course influence equity offerings 
in Asia and elsewhere, and is seen at its most ambitious in the 2003 EU prospectus directive.112 
To date, Asian securities regulators have formed an Asia-Pacific regional committee under the 
IOSCO umbrella, and are engaging in limited discussions (with support from the ADB) on 
possible use of IOSCO standards as a basis for cooperation.  
 
D.  The Role of the ADB? 
 
The ADB mixes regional interests and elements of regional governance. While its operations 
focus on regional development, 18 of the bank’s 65 shareholders are non-Asian OECD members 
that together account for 34.75 percent of votes in the bank’s supervisory board of governors. 
Members of the G-7 group hold 39.9 percent of votes in the board of governors, the latter 
electing a 12 person board of directors, four of whom represent non-Asian members. China, 
Japan and the United States each nominate a director to serve their sole interests. As with other 
Asian organizations, the regional interests of ADB policy may not coincide with the aims of all 
shareholders. Asian policymakers have been supportive of ADB efforts because of the weak 
institutional basis of other bodies, including ASEAN and APEC. 
 
At the same time, the ADB has given material support to financial sector cooperation, and 
policymakers may welcome its efforts because of a lack of resources and institutional 
weaknesses in ASEAN and APEC. For example, it became involved in a coordinating function 
with the CMI in 2005, and established six groups in 2002 to support market development with 
funding and technical assistance at the same time as the launch of the ABMI by ASEAN+3.113 
The Bank also views its own local currency funding transactions as developmental, although 
they rely more on the structuring resources of private law than reforms in national policy, and 
hopes to widen the availability of market information through a web portal more comprehensive 
                                                        
111 See DOUGLAS ARNER, Globalization of Financial Markets: An International Passport for Securities Offerings?, 
35 INT’L LAW. 1543 (2002). 
112 EU directive on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading, 
2003/71/EC, Nov. 4, 2003. 
113 Khempheng Pholsena, ADB Vice President (Finance and Administration), “Opening Remarks at the Asian Bond 
Markets Initiatives,” Seminar on Local Currency Bond Issuance by Foreign Multinational Corporations, Shanghai, 
Aug. 5, 2004, available at http://www.asiandevbank.org/Documents/Speeches/2004/ms2004049.asp (accessed Mar. 
21, 2007).   
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than many commercial or national sources.114 
 
More significantly, a new Office of Regional Economic Integration (OREI) seeks to promote 
economic cooperation and integration among the bank’s developing members and contribute to 
the region’s “harmonious economic growth.”115 This is part of the agenda of the current ADB 
president, placing emphasis on regional integration, financial integration, and providing 
resources and funding for research and related technical assistance projects and investments. A 
successful OREI may ameliorate the ADB’s generally agreed lack of coherent objectives 
compared to the World Bank, which has a focus on domestic markets and engaging with the 
commercial sector. A 2007 study by an ADB Eminent Persons Group found agreement with these 
reforms.116 
 
V.  Influences from Non-Asian Financial Integration 
 
This section V discusses three external influences relevant to Asian financial regionalism and 
governance: international trade in financial services negotiations; international financial 
standards; and European regional financial integration.  
 
A.  International Framework for Financial Services  
 
The framework for foreign participation in national financial services is subject to bilateral, 
regional and international negotiations, with the latter concentrated in the WTO process through 
the GATS.117 The GATS contains general obligations respecting trade in services, including 
                                                        
114 See http://asianbondsonline.adb.org (accessed Mar 21, 2007).  
115 Haruhiko Kuroda, ADB President, Opening Remarks, Governors’ Seminar on a Roadmap for Asia’s Economic 
Cooperation and Integration, ADB 2005 Annual Meeting, Istanbul, May 3, 2005, available at 
http://www.adb.org/AnnualMeeting/2005/Speeches/president-kuroda-speech-roadmap.html (accessed Mar. 21, 
2007). OREI was created in April 2005. 
116 Report of the Eminent Persons Group to the President of the Asian Development Bank, Towards a New Asian 
Development Bank in a New Asia (Mar. 2007). The group comprised Supachai Panitchpakdi, Isher Judge Ahluwala, 
Nobuyuki Idei, Caio Koch-Weser, Justin Yifu Lin and Lawrence Summers. 
117 As a result of the Uruguay round of negotiations, the GATS has four parts: its central agreement, eight annexes, 
schedules of commitments, and exemptions to Art. II on most favored nation treatment (MFN). The “GATS text” 
refers to the first part of the four.  
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most favored nation (MFN) treatment,118 transparency,119 and domestic regulation.120 As one 
aspect of its general coverage of services, the GATS addresses financial services.121 It also 
includes further elective provisions for financial services liberalization that set generally higher 
requirements for members.122 All these commitments form the setting and basis for negotiations 
addressing liberalization of trade in financial services, but since the provisions for foreign access 
are not inclusive, as with trade in goods, their adoption remains in the discretion of WTO 
members and financial services trade liberalization is thus often limited.  
 
Participation in the WTO process will influence future financial services liberalization in Asia 
but it is unclear at present their relation to regional cooperation. At the same time, such 
influences may be diluted by an ongoing preference for bilateral agreements. 
 
In respect to interaction with regional frameworks such as the ASEAN AFAS, the GATS does not 
prevent its members from becoming party to agreements to liberalizing the trade in services,123 
and although it contains restrictions on regional economic integration, the WTO process is 
permissive with regard to regional trade agreements. Since WTO financial commitments overlap 
with many regional trade agreements, both are relevant to any program for financial 
liberalization. Overall, at present, ASEAN agreements and AFTA obligations differ little from 
specific WTO financial sector commitments, from which some are indistinguishable, including 
those of Brunei, Cambodia and Indonesia.124 For example, Indonesia repeated certain WTO 
commitments in its ASEAN/AFTA Schedule;125 Cambodia’s ASEAN/AFTA and WTO financial 
sector commitments are generally identical; 126  and Brunei’s ASEAN/AFTA and WTO 
                                                        
118 GATS, Art. II has three paragraphs applicable to all services sectors. The first is a rule identifying MFN 
obligations in the trade in services, requiring member states to treat the services and suppliers of other members no 
less favorably than accorded to like services and service suppliers of other countries. 
119 The obligation of transparency provided by GATS, Art. III has three categories, an obligation to publish relevant 
measures or international agreements affecting the trade in services, an obligation of notification to the WTO’s 
Council for Trade in Services of new laws or changes to existing law that significantly affect that trade, and an 
obligation of formal responsiveness to requests for information by other WTO members. 
120 GATS, Art. VI. 
121 GATS, Art. I: 3(b) excludes services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority. 
122 The GATS Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services. 
123 GATS, Art. V:1. 
124 See respectively GATS/SC/95, GATS/SC/43/Suppl.3 & WT/ACC/KHM/21/Add.2 /. 
125 That access limits in the non-bank sub-sector will be eliminated by 2020 subject to similar commitments by 
other states, see GATS/SC/43/Suppl.3. 
126 On market access limitations, see WT/ACC/KHM/21/Add.2.  
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commitments are almost identical.127  
 
In contrast, China’s WTO accession commitments to liberalize banking and insurance are more 
extensive than those of other most other developing economies,128 and it can be argued that 
China’s influence on ASEAN+3 may lead to broader financial services liberalization among 
ASEAN+3 members currently maintaining more restrictive GATS commitments. In addition to 
China, Cambodia’s WTO commitments are probably the most liberal in the region, followed by 
Hong Kong, Singapore, Vietnam and China. However, these commitments (to the extent 
applicable: China and Hong Kong are not ASEAN members) have not been actually replicated in 
the AFAS framework. 
 
The framework is a sound beginning to supporting foreign competition in financial services trade, 
but needs to be extended through negotiation and incorporated into international standards. This 
is important in the relationship between liberalization and financial stability. Acceding WTO 
members commit to certain levels of financial services liberalization in banking, securities 
markets and insurance, but taking such measures without regard for sequencing and safeguards 
can be a precursor to excessive volatility, and was a consideration in the Asian financial crisis. 
Analysis of recent crises also indicates the essential function of institutions, including the role of 
law, enforcement, regulation and legal systems in lessening or making manageable the risks 
associated with financial liberalization.129  Linkages in prudential regulation and financial 
liberalization are increasingly accepted and have been recognized as important in EU regional 
financial integration. 
 
B.  International Financial Standards 
 
One response to financial crises in the 1990s was a series of standards and codes to deal with 
institutional weaknesses and contagion. Above all, the 1994-95 Mexican financial crisis caused 
                                                        
127  They differ only in respect of the sub-sector, advisory and other auxiliary financial services, see 
ASEAN/AFTAGATS/SC/95.  
128  See JAMES BARTH, ZHONGFEI ZHOU, DOUGLAS ARNER, BERRY HSU & WEI WANG (eds.), FINANCIAL 
RESTRUCTURING AND REFORM IN POST-WTO CHINA (Kluwer, 2006). Domestic motives may have helped prompt 
the scale of China’s undertakings. 
129 See ARNER, ch. 8, supra note 1. 
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leading industrial nations to seek mechanisms to protect against systemic financial instability 
induced by shocks of all kinds.130 In 1996, the Group of Ten (G-10) states examined with 
emerging and transition economies how best to foster financial stability,131 finding that robust 
systems are less susceptible to crisis and more resilient if such crises materialize.132 The study 
cited three essential elements in robust financial systems: the creation of institutions and 
infrastructure necessary for a sound credit culture and effective markets; promoting the 
functioning of markets so that commercial actors exercise adequate discipline over financial 
intermediaries; and creating regulatory and compliance arrangements to complement market 
discipline.133 The IMF, World Bank and regional development banks were entrusted to lead in 
providing technical assistance to strengthen national financial systems, and are meant to 
cooperate in so doing so as to avoid overlapping or disjunctive efforts. 
 
The system of international standards to encourage emerging market stability has four 
characteristics:134 First, an international consensus has developed regarding elements necessary 
to sound financial and regulatory systems.135 Second, international and national authorities 
collaborate in specific fields to formulate sound principles and practices through certain fora, 
including the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB) and IOSCO. Third, jurisdictions (both national and regional) implement standards 
directly into their respective legal and regulatory frameworks. Fourth, multilateral institutions 
promote sound principles and practices. The burden of strengthening financial systems lies with 
national governments and their agencies, but both the WTO financial framework and evolving 
                                                        
130 See DOUGLAS ARNER, The Mexican Peso Crisis of 1994-95: Implications for the Regulation of Financial 
Markets, 2 L. & BUS. REV. AMERICAS 28 (1996).  
131 Report of the Group of Ten Working Party on Financial Stability in Emerging Markets, Financial Stability in 
Emerging Market Economies: a Strategy for the Formulation, Adoption and Implementation of Sound Principles and 
Practices to Strengthen Financial Systems (“G-10 Strategy 1997”), G-10, Apr. 1997. The framework was developed 
further among the Group of 22 Systemically Significant Countries (G-22), Reports on the International Financial 
Architecture, Oct. 1998. All G-10 publications are available at http://www.bis.org. 
132 Crises are taken to have a potentially deleterious effect on social and economic instability, growth and lead to 
less efficient allocations of savings and investment. Id. at 1. 
133 Id. at 3-4. 
134 See ARNER, ch. 3, supra note 1. 
135 This is not to emphasize concerns that may be ephemeral, for example, regulators are now absorbed by the 
results of credit risk being dispersed among non-bank intermediaries subject to light supervision of capital or 
liquidity. Former UK regulatory head Howard Davies stated at the 2007 Davos World Economic Forum:  
We all know that the reality of the financial markets is that risk is being parcelled up and paced 
around. But international regulatory architecture is still organised as if the world had not changed. 
As a result, we have a regulatory architecture designed for a bygone age.  
See Gillian Tett, “Derivatives bring drama to Davos,” Fin’l Times, Feb. 1, 2007.  
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international financial standards are compatible with and potentially reinforcing of regional 
financial integration, as has been most soundly demonstrated by experiences in Europe. 
 
C.  Europe’s Experience with Financial Integration 
 
It has long been controversial to draw generic lessons from EU experience as to conditions or 
prospects for regionalism136 but the approach taken elsewhere to specific technical aspects of 
financial integration may be helpful in discussing the obstacles that Asia confronts. In analyzing 
European experience, a number of stages can be identified. At the first stage, European officials 
recognized the potential benefits of and barriers to European financial integration. An influential 
1966 study was first to address impediments to the functioning of Europe’s national markets and 
their openness to foreign borrowers,137 identifying a home bias towards national governments 
and other domestic borrowers achieved through regulations on permissible investment by banks 
and insurers. Further, few companies were listed outside their domiciles. These conditions 
generally reflect how Asia’s markets function some 40 years later, albeit with greater 
transactional sophistication.  
 
Financial integration among EU states is the most developed of any region, the result of 
objectives set over a long period since the 1950s, in particular to the creation of a single internal 
market in financial services. Advances in integration have transformed major markets among 
professional intermediaries but Europe’s trade in retail financial services remains fragmented and 
not yet subject to regional competition.138 This is the result of strong national socio-economic 
                                                        
136 ERNST HAAS, Turbulent Fields and the Theory of Regional Integration, 30 INT. ORG. 2, 173 (1976). 
137 See SEGRÉ ET AL, supra note 14. 
138 The EU’s official view in 2005 was that:  
A long-anticipated surge in EU cross-border banking integration and consolidation has failed to 
materialize. This failure is striking in view of several apparently catalytic developments — notably 
the liberalization of capital movements and efforts to create an internal market in financial services 
[… ] However, cross-border integration have [sic.] not been major features of developments in EU 
retail banking in recent years and this latest disappointment suggests that obstacles — other than 
exchange-rate risk – have yet to be addressed. 
See The EU Economy: 2005 Review (European Union, 2003) available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/the_eu_economy_review2005_en.htm 
(accessed Jan. 31, 2007). One leading banker argues that: 
a unified European financial market is still far from reality. One reason is that even where the 
[Financial Services Action Plan] has created a common legal basis, there are differences in actual 
implementation of the rules by the member states. [… ] Another reason is that in some segments, 
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norms that reform and regulation find difficult to overturn, although the introduction of the euro 
may have induced greater similarities in national retail financial markets.139  
 
EU founding treaties provide for free movement of goods, services, workers and capital, and 
freedom of establishment. In theory, investments may be made without restriction across national 
borders. However, these initial ideals did not begin to have real meaning until the mid-1980s, the 
second stage of EU financial integration focusing on harmonization to minimum standards. 
Today’s level of integration has been achieved in these dimensions partly due to supportive 
rulings of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), and markets have become considerably 
harmonized,140 so that national legislation over most market segments now reflects regionally 
initiated developments. Member states must adhere to certain precepts so that decisions and 
legislation passed at EU level will directly affect those in individual states, while national 
governments may be liable in damages for failing to implement EU legislation to the detriment 
of their citizens. No similar obligations exist elsewhere in a regional setting. In a more technical 
sense EU experience shows how collaboration and political integration may encourage the 
adoption of sound principles and practices. The concept of mutual recognition and a system 
providing a single regulatory license for financial intermediaries now allow EU directives to set 
minimum norms without hindering competition.  
 
The EU legislative framework for financial markets seeks equivalence among disparate 
regulatory and legal systems, so that regional initiatives recognize national legal and regulatory 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
Europe still lacks the necessary legal and institutional framework for truly integrated markets. […] 
Even worse is the situation in retail markets.  
See Josef Ackermann, Chairman, Deutsche Bank, “Europe has to storm cross-border financial barriers”, Fin’l Times, 
Jan. 25, 2007. Furthermore, 
removing the remaining barriers to market integration will require what trade experts call “deep 
integration”, that is, addressing issues such as consumer protection regimes and mortgage 
collateral laws that have so far been the prerogative of individual member states.  
Id. This characterization applies to many Asian market sectors. Impediments to European financial services 
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139 See CHRISTOFFER KOK SØRENSEN & JOSEP MARIA PUIGVERT GUTIÉRREZ, EURO AREA BANKING SECTOR 
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140 ELEMER TERTAK, Director, European Commission Financial Institutions Directorate, speech at the Conference 
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regimes. 141  Rule harmonization proved impossible for many activities and the European 
Commission adopted principles first outlined in a 1985 white paper (the basis of the second stage 
of development),142 that led to the Single European Act.143 This stipulated a common internal 
market based upon mutual recognition and common minimum standards, made applicable by EU 
directives and brought into effect through domestic law.144 Member states would recognize each 
other’s law, regulations and authorities structured along common minimum standards, enabling 
the freeing of the trade in goods and services without need for prior harmonization.145 The 
system also uses minimum regional requirements to limit competitive deregulation by state 
actors and regulatory arbitrage by commercial parties. 
 
National financial regulation in Europe has intensified in recent years due to a combination of 
the needs of government and pressure from harmonization, access deregulation, and prudential 
re-regulation inherent in the process of market opening developed under the Maastricht Treaty 
for unhindered capital mobility. The EU framework for financial services provides minimum 
standards for financial intermediaries, securities regulation, accounting, company law, and 
regulation of institutional investors, based on intermediation being unfettered by national borders 
or restrictions on activity, and an open internal market. However, harmonization leaves the 
framework incomplete since it augments rather than replaces existing national laws. 
 
Today’s single market is manifested in “passport directives,” 146  by which an authorized 
intermediary may generally be able to supply services overseas directly or through a foreign 
branch without maintaining a permanent presence in its target market.147 The passport’s aim is to 
promote competition and allow intermediaries to choose how they deliver products or services 
into any part of the internal market.148 Passport directives in financial services define the 
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intermediary to which they apply, its activities or market segment, the conditions for initial and 
continuing authorizations, the division of regulatory responsibility between the home (domicile) 
state and the host (target) state,149 and aspects of dealings with non-EU member states.150 Such 
free movement of capital to facilitate European monetary union became effective through the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1994. This provided an impetus for states to implement prior financial 
services directives and led to members other than Ireland and the United Kingdom adopting 
legislation that was foreign to their traditional market practices. The introduction of the euro in 
1999 had a further catalytic effect on the nature of market flows and activity. Following the 
introduction of the single currency, EU members were forced to turn once again to increasing 
levels of regulatory convergence, a process which is ongoing and represents the third stage of 
development.  
 
Prior to this degree of political consent, commercial interests may have been a force for financial 
integration, if only among professional intermediaries. Until the 1990s introduced a high 
common level of regulatory intensity, the Eurobond markets and eurocurrency interbank markets 
were permissive institutions that arose as a result of national legal and regulatory impediments to 
capital flows of all kinds.151 Eventually their scale began to rival national markets in banking 
and securities, leading to protracted negotiations in the early 1990s between industry 
representatives and regulators that resulted in offshore activity infiltrating national markets and 
subsuming many disparate local practices. The process became entrenched with the introduction 
of the euro. There is little near-term chance of Asia following this precedent, regardless of 
whether the offshore European markets of the 1970s and 1980s were part of a trend towards 
financial integration or relied upon institutional barriers to be effective. One contemporary 
source saw the Eurobond market as a substitute for financial integration, given that capital 
mobility was only a secondary EU goal until the 1990s.152 Others referred to the Eurobond 
market relying on an “asymmetry” between local and foreign targeted national capital 
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controls. 153  Similarly, the 1966 Segré report was prescient of the potential for financial 
integration or how officially inspired integration might be confounded by commercial interests. 
If a capital market can be established anywhere, then what need is there for formal integration 
unless and until monetary integration is also an objective?154 
 
VI.  Conclusion: Governance and Financial Integration 
 
Europe’s protracted experience in forming a single regional financial market indicates the scale 
of obstacles to Asian financial integration, which at best is only at a level equivalent to the first 
stage of European efforts. Policy attention given since the mid-1990s to Asian market 
development has led to two tangible results. The first, a repurchase line construct (the CMI), may 
be discounted; the second, two ABFs, is constrained from directly affecting liquidity or 
supporting development at any meaningful level. Yet that these steps have been taken 
nonetheless suggests that practical objectives could be employed to guide all national and 
regional reforms. If regionalism is taken to be the results of a large scale conception, for 
example: 
From a “global” perspective, regionalism constitutes a transnationalization of 
economic and political activity, which implies the transcendence of state 
boundaries in the interests of ensuring cooperation and reducing the potential for 
conflict.155 
Or alternatively: 
From a “bottom-up” perspective, the formation of a regional bloc is concerned 
with various dimensions of state-building. The rationale for regionalism is 
invariably that there are common goals which can best be pursued in concert with 
other states or actors.156  
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Even if the transnational model of regionalism has no application in Asia due to entrenched 
national interests, the more practical functionalism implicit in the second alternative is a limited 
objective in financial integration to which ASEAN+3 members may become willing to accept.157 
This in turn suggests that Asia can gain insight from EU experience in certain technical respects: 
the principle of minimum harmonization together with mutual recognition 
principles underlines the potential for leaving integration to market forces once 
national legal and regulatory frameworks share common minimum standards.158  
 
As such, elements of the second stage of European financial regionalization may eventually 
assist the process of Asian financial cooperation and development, notably in mutual recognition, 
harmonization to common minimum standards and shared commitments to reform. Initiatives 
adopted within ASEAN+3 and EMEAP may increase accountability, transparency and the extent 
of participation in reform by commercial actors in ways that become generally beneficial to 
economic development. This is conceptually similar to ASEAN’s existing approach and accords 
with the ADB identifying accountability, predictability, participation and transparency as 
principles of essential financial governance.159  
 
Cooperation in financial policy among Asia’s economies has a short history and slender results, 
even though Asia’s need for market reforms is associated with substantial tasks in national and 
multilateral policymaking, and might have been profoundly accelerated by the 1997-98 crisis. 
Past regional initiatives on financial issues have lacked practicality, or foundered when 
confronted by competing national interests, especially from China, Japan and the United 
States,160 leading to doubts as to the effective influence in financial policy formation of Asia’s 
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multiplicity of regional bodies.161 To the extent that material results now exist, their value may 
rest in the fact of completion. At the same time, there have been long-standing examples of the 
adoption by national authorities of like external financial policies, most clearly seen in currency 
management in the five years prior to 1997.  
 
Asia’s economic and financial integration lacks an institutional and legal framework set within 
the region. In contrast to the rule-focused WTO or European Union, the region’s economic 
organizations and institutions are oriented towards bilateral dealings among participating states 
and are deliberately intended to have minimal impact on national sovereignty. More generally, 
greater financial integration requires a new approach to governance, in which three aspects of 
policy would be prominent. 
 
First, states would recognize shared interests in protecting regional competitiveness. This might 
imply the acceptance in due course of certain political consequences, for example in considering 
whether external mercantilism need be paramount in national economic policy. Such issues 
become paramount in the context of exchange rate arrangements, suggesting that such aspects 
will likely remain problematic but perhaps permitting an increasing cooperative approach to 
reserves and regional investment. At the same time, in the state-led arena, efforts to bring 
regional financial services trade commitments in line with international negotiations offer the 
possibly the most promising route, especially if China begins to hold others to similar 
liberalization commitments to those which it has made in the context of WTO accession. 
 
Second, the commercial sector has been included in Asian financial integration only as a residual 
matter and, in contrast with the EU pattern, given no transparent role in governance other than 
any resulting from global initiatives. Financial integration may require “multi-level governance” 
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that involves many actors, rather than Asia’s state-centric tradition.162 In fact, it is actually the 
case that sub-national actors such as central banks and financial regulatory agencies have locus 
of the most developed initiatives to date. In all likelihood, and reflecting experiences with 
international financial standards and technocratic cooperation, regional efforts toward regulatory 
cooperation and harmonization to common regional standards based upon international standards 
and perhaps influenced by EU legal instruments are amongst the most promising roads towards 
greater integration, financial stability and development. 
 
Finally, since Asia’s prevailing regional organizations and institutions are weak or constrained by 
state-orientated governance, the outcome for future financial integration and development is a 
function of the nature of the actors involved in their instigation, whether they represent national, 
commercial or other interests.  
 
In effect, such adjustments would augment mechanisms for convergence in financial activity and 
regulation. During the 1997-98 crisis, national authorities failed to find collaborative or regional 
solutions to regional problems of contagion. Ten years later, the situation in all likelihood would 
be no more accommodating in a future shock, unless China for reasons of extending its own 
influence determined to provide support. Without devoting resources in governance to improve 
regional financial integration and support domestic legal and regulatory reform, Asian economies 
will continue to rely heavily on risk averse portfolio management, in particular by holding high 
foreign currency reserves, to the detriment of their own financial development and stability.  
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